Texas Supreme Court
In re J.J.T.
No. 23-1028 3/28/25
Issue:
Does development of probable cause before a juvenile turns 18 prevent application of the statute (Family Code §54.02(j)) allowing the juvenile court to transfer the case to adult criminal court?
Holding:
Not necessarily. “Development of probable cause, standing alone, does not conclusively determine whether it is ‘practicable to proceed’ with a juvenile prosecution before a person reaches adulthood. Other reasons beyond the control of the State may support such a finding. However, because the juvenile court’s findings similarly erred in conflating ‘practicable to proceed’ with the existence of probable cause, we remand the case to the juvenile court for a new transfer hearing.” Read opinion
Commentary:
This decision should be very helpful for juvenile prosecutors because it firmly establishes that probable cause is not the determining factor in whether it was practicable for the State to proceed before a juvenile offender became an adult. The high court also provided a great deal of deference to the State in conducting its investigation and to the juvenile trial judge in making factual findings. The high court remanded the case back to the juvenile court for a new transfer hearing, but there does appear to be promise for the State in properly obtaining a transfer order for the juvenile defendant to be certified to adult criminal district court. In the first full paragraph of page 16 of the court’s opinion, the court seems to consider favorably the facts that the State developed to show that it was not practicable for the State to proceed before the juvenile offender became an adult. All juvenile prosecutors should read this very important decision.
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Wells v. State
No. PD-0669-23 4/2/25
Issue:
Did the use of a geofence warrant to obtain location history data from Google violate the Fourth Amendment?
Holding:
No. Because the geofence warrant was specifically limited in its initial search parameters to maximize the possibility that every device searched in the area would have to have been possessed by either a suspect or a witness, and it minimized the possibility of intrusion on innocent people, the warrant and affidavit were sufficiently particular to avoid the prohibition on general warrants. The Court also concluded that under the facts of this case, the geofence warrant was specific enough not to “require an additional magisterial imprimatur in the later stages of its execution. … Assuming that the Fourth Amendment generally requires police to obtain a search warrant for corporate-held location history data, we conclude that the geofence warrant in this case was supported by probable cause and that it satisfied the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Read opinion.
Concurrence (Finley, J., joined by Parker, J.):
“Notwithstanding my joining Judge Yeary’s opinion today that would uphold the constitutionality of the geofence warrant, I write separately to explain that, in my view, we do not need to reach that issue: Law enforcement did not conduct an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment because Appellant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information he voluntarily turned over to a third party.” Read concurrence.
Concurrence and dissent (Newell, J., joined by Richardson and Walker, JJ.):
“The most important question before us is whether the geofence warrant amounts to a constitutionally protected search. Instead of answering that question, Judge Yeary’s opinion assumes it away and in doing so crafts an opinion that ensures that we will never have to answer the question. It turns this case from a geofence warrant case into a probable cause case that will essentially lower the standard for probable cause for all warrants just to uphold a search pursuant to a novel type of warrant. I disagree that the geofence warrant in this case was adequately supported by probable cause. I would hold instead that Appellant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the limited information sought through the geofence warrant’s first and second steps. … But I would hold that Appellant did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information sought by the warrant’s third step, which included six months of prior IP history.” Read concurrence and dissent.
Commentary:
A geofence warrant is a device by which law enforcement is able to identify cell phone and other mobile devices within a very small area during a very specific time period: the location and time of the charged offense. In this case, the warrant confined itself to specific areas where law enforcement knew the murderer was located at or near the time of the offense—part of a church’s grounds and two residences. Unfortunately, Judge Yeary’s opinion for the court is a plurality opinion, with three judges joining Judge Yeary’s opinion, two judges joining Judge Newell’s dissenting/concurring opinion, one judge dissenting on his own (without an opinion), and one judge not participating. Thus, Texas prosecutors may have to wait for the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the issue. Nevertheless, Judge Yeary’s opinion is still valuable because it explains the law very well and cites to many (perhaps all) of the decisions that have confronted the validity of a geofence warrant, with the two leading (and competing) federal appellate court decisions being cited in footnote 4 of Judge Yeary’s opinion. A geofence warrant can be a very valuable tool for law enforcement, but law enforcement and prosecutors should proceed cautiously in using such a warrant until we get a definitive opinion from the Court of Criminal Appeals or the U.S. Supreme Court.
Texas Courts of Appeals
Morales v. State
No. 02-24-00065-CR 3/27/25
Issue:
Does Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 13.1 violate the 14th Amendment’s due process clause by allowing a defendant to waive his right to have a court reporter attend and make a record of a punishment hearing in a felony case?
Holding:
No. The court concluded that because the defendant failed to raise his due process complaint in the trial court, he failed to preserve it for appellate review. “Further, even if Morales had preserved his sole appellate issue, we would overrule it on the merits. Texas courts have consistently held that the right to have a court reporter attend a court session and record the proceedings is one that may be forfeited.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
Although the defendant raised a due process issue regarding Rule 13.1, this decision is entirely about whether he properly objected to the absence of a court reporter at the punishment hearing. Maybe nothing of importance happened in this off-the-record punishment hearing after the defendant pleaded guilty. In the typical case, a defendant will request a court reporter. Furthermore, because of the nature of modern post-conviction litigation, the trial prosecutor should make sure that a court reporter is taking everything down in a trial.
Ex parte Taff
Nos. 11-24-00024-CR & -00025-CR 3/27/25
Issue:
Is the offense of exploitation of an elderly individual (Penal Code §32.53) facially unconstitutional by failing to define “illegal” and “improper?”
Holding:
No. “[W]e conclude that persons of ordinary intelligence would understand the unassailable criminal impropriety of obtaining a protected individual’s assets through some form of dishonesty, manipulation, deceit, coercion, or misrepresentation, or by otherwise taking advantage of the protected individual.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
This is a very well-researched and well-written opinion. It should be valuable for those prosecutors who handle elderly exploitation cases. Prosecutors confronted with facial challenges to the constitutionality of a statute should also read this very helpful decision.
Gomez-Aldana v. State
No. 14-23-00329-CR & -00330-CR 4/1/25
Issue:
Did police improperly make a copy of a video recording from the defendant’s home security system without a warrant when the defendant’s wife had consented to let officers view the video recorded by the home’s outside surveillance cameras?
Holding:
No. “Assuming, without deciding, that copying the video was outside of the scope of [the wife’s] consent, we nevertheless conclude that [the officer’s] seizure of the video was reasonable and lawful because the record supports a finding that the incriminating character of the video was immediately apparent to [the officer] and thus the plain-view doctrine applied.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
The court does not directly address whether copying the video was outside the scope of the wife’s consent. Nevertheless, prosecutors should be warned. In order for the plain view doctrine to be successful in this case, the officer’s conduct in viewing the video had to be based on the wife’s consent. After being called to a residence where a stabbing had been reported, the officer observed the defendant on the video, and the video depicted the defendant walking with a beer bottle, one of the weapons used in the offense. This may be a plain view decision, but it is also very much a decision based upon consent. As such, the decision may be bound to its unique facts.