Texas Courts of Appeals
Botello v. State
No. 14-21-00304-CR 03/30/23
Issue:
Did a trial court err in refusing to order production of family violence screening forms during trial based on its finding that the forms were not subject to discovery because the victim and the victim assistance coordinator filled them out?
Holding:
Yes. The Court held that the trial court should have ordered the production of the screening forms, where the victim expressed a desire to drop charges. The court determined, however, that no substantial right was affected by the trial court’s error in failing to require production of the two forms under Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 39.14(a), because the prosecutor’s office had sent an email to the defense letting them know of information contained in the two forms, including that the victim wanted to drop the charges. Read opinion.
Commentary:
In this case, the defendant raised both the trial judge’s denial of the motion for mistrial and the trial judge’s refusal to order the disclosure of the form. The court of appeals addressed only the latter question—the statutory violation of the Michael Morton Act. This distinction may not make much difference as a practical matter, but appellate prosecutors may want to pay attention to the distinction in determining the way that an appellate court might review a statutory or constitutional error raised by way of a motion for mistrial. (In this case, the defendant also raised the failure to disclose in his motion for new trial, but that aspect of the case is not really discussed in the opinion.)
In conducting that analysis under the Michael Morton Act, however, the court of appeals treats it very much the same as an overall analysis for a Brady violation. As such, this decision may be of questionable help in addressing the appropriate analysis for a Michael Morton Act violation. The Court of Criminal Appeals should be addressing that issue in the near future in other cases.
The actual harm analysis was easy for the court of appeals to apply in this case because the record was clear that the State had repeatedly disclosed to the defense the significant facts in the two screening forms. The bottom line for trial prosecutors is that relevant evidence—such as these two forms—should be disclosed under the Michael Morton Act, unless an exceptionally clear case can be made that the evidence is otherwise privileged.
Crawford v. State
No. 04-22-00046-CR 03/29/23
Issue:
Did the trial court err by allowing the language “public servant” and “peace officer” to be used interchangeably, when the State indicted the defendant for assault on a public servant, and not assault on a peace officer?
Holding:
Yes. The variance between the indictment and the charge resulted in error. By definition, a peace officer is a public servant (though not vice versa). “Assault on a public servant” and “assault on a peace officer” may not be used interchangeably, because the phrases carry different implications for defendants charged with assault under Penal Code §22.01. “Whichever choice is made between ‘peace officer’ and ‘public servant’ when charging assault on someone in one of those roles, that choice will apply throughout the trial (barring any amendments).” The court concluded that the language in the defendant’s indictment and in the jury’s verdict form invoked a third-degree felony, assault on a public servant, rather than a second-degree felony, assault on a peace officer. The court remanded for a new punishment hearing. Read opinion.
Commentary:
The indictment alleged that the victim was a “public servant, to wit: Menard County Deputy Sheriff …” In the verdict form, the jury found the defendant guilty of “Assault of a Public Servant, to-wit: a Menard County Sheriff’s Deputy.” Under Art. 2.12(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, deputy sheriffs are “peace officers.” Nevertheless, the indictment and verdict form should have expressly identified the victim as a “peace officer,” to make it clear that the State was charging the second-degree felony under §22.01(b-2), as opposed to the third-degree felony under §22.01(b)(1).