Texas Courts of Appeals
Glover v. State
No. 01-22-00366-CR 5/30/24
Issue:
Did the trial court err by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his cell phone?
Holding:
Yes. The search warrant affidavit supporting the cell phone search was conclusory and failed to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s constitutional requirements. Glover had been arrested in Louisiana on a rape charge and had a cell phone in his possession at the time of arrest. In furtherance of the rape investigation, Louisiana law enforcement submitted an affidavit to search the cell phone for an alleged incriminating text. After downloading the contents of the phone, Louisiana officers saw evidence of a prescription fraud crime committed in Texas. The Court found that the affidavit suffered from two deficiencies, either of which would preclude a finding of probable cause: (1) insufficient facts about the crime and the cell phone’s connection to that crime; (2) the affidavit failed “to provide any details about where [law enforcement] obtained the information that (1) [the defendant] had allegedly committed the rape; and (2) the supposedly incriminating text would be found on [the defendant’s] phone.” Because the defendant was harmed by admission of evidence from the phone, the Court remanded the case for a new trial. Read opinion.
Dissent (Goodman, J.):
“The main flaw in the majority’s reasoning is that the majority refuses to give any deference to the magistrate’s probable cause determination or the reasonable inferences he could have made from the information provided in the search warrant. This error leads the majority to ignore the facts stated in the affidavit, which are sparse but sufficient to satisfy the standard for search warrants set out in the Code of Criminal Procedure. This error also leads the majority to ignore the only logical inference regarding the source of the information and instead apply irrelevant requirements of credibility and reliability reserved for ‘criminal snitch[es]’” (internal citations omitted). Read dissent.
Commentary:
The dissenting opinion may be correct that the affidavit in this case provided a nexus between the cell phone to be searched and the criminal activity that was being investigated—the rape. The dissenting opinion may also be correct that it was a reasonable inference that the source of the information received by the affiant/officer was the victim of the rape. However, that does not necessarily mean that this affidavit is sufficient to establish probable cause. The affidavit in this case is quoted on pages 7-8 of the majority opinion. The majority opinion does correctly note that the affidavit provided no details regarding the offense—the rape—that was under investigation, including when the rape actually occurred. This affidavit is certainly not a model of what a search warrant affidavit should look like. Prosecutors should nevertheless read these two opinions because they provide a good summary of the most important case law on the sufficiency of search warrant affidavits.