Supreme Court of the United States
Culley v. Marshall
No. 22-585 5/9/24
Issue:
In a civil asset forfeiture case, does the U.S. Constitution require a separate preliminary hearing to determine whether law enforcement may retain the personal property pending the forfeiture hearing?
Holding:
No. The Court’s majority considered the proposal of a preliminary hearing before the forfeiture hearing to be superfluous: “In essence, the preliminary hearing would be an earlier version of the forfeiture hearing itself.” The Court noted that “a timely post-seizure forfeiture hearing” (emphasis in original) is already a due process requirement: “After a State seizes and seeks civil forfeiture of personal property, due process requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a separate preliminary hearing.” Read opinion.
Concurrence (Gorsuch, J.):
“In this Nation, the right to a jury trial before the government may take life, liberty, or property has always been the rule. Yes, some exceptions exist. But perhaps it is past time for this Court to examine more fully whether and to what degree contemporary civil forfeiture practices align with that rule and those exceptions.” Read concurrence.
Dissent (Sotomayor, J.):
“In short, law enforcement can seize cars, hold them indefinitely, and then rely on an owner’s lack of resources to forfeit those cars to fund agency budgets, all without any initial check by a judge as to whether there is a basis to hold the car in the first place.” Read dissent.
Commentary:
If you work with civil asset forfeiture, this case serves as a good reminder that, even if asset-forfeiture statutes do not delineate a specific timeframe for the State to initiate post-seizure forfeiture proceedings, due process requires that the State do so in a “timely” manner. This case will likely have little impact in Texas, though, because, under CCP Art. 59.04(a), the State must “commence proceedings” for asset forfeiture “not later than the 30th day after the date of the seizure”—which bakes in a timeliness requirement that should satisfy due process concerns.
On another note, Justice Sotomayor’s qualms about the State “seiz[ing] cars” or other contraband and then “hold[ing] them indefinitely” while forfeiture proceedings are pending are somewhat less relevant in Texas than in Alabama (where this case originates) because, unlike in Alabama, Texas specifically authorizes the owner or interest holder of certain types of seized property to post a bond to regain custody of the property pending the outcome of the forfeiture proceeding. Compare Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 59.02(b) with Ala. Code §20-2-93(r) (“Property taken or detained under this section shall not be subject to replevin, but is deemed to be in the custody of the seizing agency, subject only to the orders and judgment of the court having jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceedings.”) (emphasis added).
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Ex parte White
No. WR-84,934-07 5/15/24
Issue:
Can a defendant raise an ineffective assistance claim in an application for habeas relief under Code of Criminal Procedure art. 11.07, arguing that his trial attorney failed to raise a claim of double jeopardy for his convictions for capital murder, attempted murder, and aggravated assault?
Holding:
Yes. The double jeopardy claim is not barred by the prohibition against subsequent claims in Art. 11.07, §4. Read opinion.
Dissent (Keller, P.J., joined by Yeary, Keel, and Slaughter, J.J.):
Because the defendant’s double-jeopardy claim is not based on new facts or new law, he can only rely on the subsequent-writ bar by meeting the “innocence gateway” exception, which requires a defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that no rational juror could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. “The Supreme Court could not have been more clear: two charged offenses that are the same for double-jeopardy purposes can be submitted to the jury, even if conviction on both would violate double jeopardy. Violation of double jeopardy is prevented by entering judgment on only one of the offenses. … As a practical matter, if a defendant is charged with two offenses that are the same for double-jeopardy purposes, and it violates double jeopardy to submit them both to the jury, how would a trial judge know which offense to submit to the jury and which offense to dismiss? A jury might find a defendant guilty of one but not the other if both were submitted, and if the judge dismissed the wrong case, a defendant whom the jury believed guilty of the other offense would walk free. …” Read dissent.
Commentary:
Writs practitioners, take heed. In a departure from the Court’s previous stance on this issue in Ex parte Aubin, 537 S.W.3d 39, 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (plurality op.), the Court here creates another exception to the general subsequent-writ bar provided by CCP Art. 11.07, §4. Of course, this doesn’t mean that a claim related to double-jeopardy will necessarily succeed on the merits; just that the defendant can now raise that claim in a subsequent writ application.
Texas Attorney General Opinion
KP-0464 5/13/24
Issue:
Under the Texas Mental Health Code (Health & Safety Code Chapter 571), who must pay the filing fee for an application for court-ordered mental health services, and when must the filing fee be paid?
Conclusion:
Under Health and Safety Code §571.018(a) and (b), counties generally are responsible for paying filing fees for an application for court-ordered mental health services. However, §571.018(i) authorizes a county to require that “a person” pay filing fees if the county first determines the fees relate to services from a private mental hospital. Under Chapter 571, a “person” does not include a governmental entity. For services delivered by a private mental hospital, a county may require medical facilities that are not governmental entities to pay application filing fees. If a county is responsible for paying filing fees for an application for court-ordered mental health services, it need not pay the fees at the time the application is filed. However, if the county instead requires payment from a “person” under §571.018(i)(1), that person must pay the fees at the time of filing. Read conclusion.
Requested by:
John Creuzot, Dallas County District Attorney
Texas Attorney General Opinion Requests
RQ-0538-KP 5/6/24
Issue:
What is the authority of a sheriff to contract with other local governments and private entities for the off-duty work of sheriff deputies? Read request for opinion.
Requested by:
Cindy Havelka, Fayette County Auditor