Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Taylor v. State
No. PD-0660-22 05/17/23
Issue:
In a speedy-trial claim, is a specific evidentiary hearing, with the trial court evaluating the factors discussed in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), required before an appeals court can analyze the speedy-trial claim?
Holding:
No. “Instead, the only requirement is that the relevant information be in the record—the length of the delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right, and prejudice.” While the record did not show what type of prejudice, if any, the defendant suffered, “that potential deficiency does not prevent an appellate court from weighing the factors; it merely affects how they will be weighed.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
This very short decision does not stand for the proposition that the defendant is going to win on his speedy-trial claim—or lose it. This decision only means that the court of appeals should have addressed the claim. This decision also stands for the proposition that evidence regarding only one of the Barker factors—the length of the delay—will be insufficient by itself to grant a motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds or to reverse the denial of such a motion to dismiss on appeal. In most cases, the relevant information on a defendant’s speedy-trial claim will not be in the record. Therefore, in those cases, prosecutors should make sure that relevant evidence is in the record if a defendant could raise a speedy-trial claim.
Texas Court of Appeals
Rancoco v. State
No. 14-21-00632-CR 05/11/23
Issue:
Does a defendant have the right to a factual sufficiency review of all the evidence—not just evidence in favor of the verdict—on request under Texas Constitution Art. V, §6?
Holding:
No. Under Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), a plurality of the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that “the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” The Brooks opinion, while a plurality opinion, has been upheld consistently. Read opinion.
Concurrence (Spain, J.):
“Barring amendments to the Texas Constitution to remove the factual-conclusively clause in Article V, §6(a), to remove Code of Criminal Procedure Article 44.25, and to affirmatively negate factual-sufficiency review, the legitimacy question is reasonable.” Read concurrence.
Commentary:
Do not think for a second that the evidence in this case—aggravated sexual assault of a child—is weak. The majority opinion makes that clear in its discussion of the legal sufficiency of the evidence. From time to time, there have been defense attempts to resurrect the civil-law concept of factual sufficiency review to determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a criminal offense. Factual sufficiency review still applies to some issues in criminal cases, for things like the sufficiency of the evidence to show an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The decision in Brooks might be considered a plurality opinion by some because only three other judges expressly joined Judge Hervey, who authored the court’s opinion. However, the two concurring judges in Brooks clearly agreed with the court’s opinion that factual sufficiency review would no longer be appropriate for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a defendant’s guilt. That could not have been clearer when Judge Cochran wrote in that concurring opinion, “I agree that it is time to consign the civil-law concept of factual sufficiency review in criminal cases to the dustbin of history.” Readers can consider for themselves what “dustbin of history” means, but it sounds pretty bad.