Texas Courts of Appeals
Lee v. State
No. 11-21-00253-CR 10/05/23
Issue:
Does using a state-owned computer to access information on a police department’s database about civilians’ driving records and records of interactions with law enforcement provide sufficient evidence that the defendant intended to harm a person under the misuse of government property statute (Penal Code §39.02(a)(2))?
Holding:
No. The evidence at trial did not demonstrate that the defendant had a malicious intent behind any of the searches. Rather, the prosecution’s evidence demonstrated only that the defendant police officer’s intentions were unclear. The court reversed the judgment of the trial court and rendered a judgment of acquittal. Read opinion.
Commentary:
The State’s evidence showed that the defendant/officer accessed the “information” about various individuals, but the opinion does not specify what that “information” was, except in one instance, when the defendant accessed the driving record of one of those people. There is an offense for accessing criminal record information for an unauthorized purpose—§411.085 of the Government Code—and it does not require intent to obtain a benefit, intent to defraud, or the valuation of the property that was misused. However, that offense does not encompass accessing and/or disclosure of driving records. Those of us who have access to criminal records are routinely tested on how to protect that information and the requirement that the information must not be accessed and/or disclosed for unauthorized purposes. That does not mean that every violation should be a crime, but there should be some consequence for the violation. This decision details how difficult it can be to prove a violation of §39.02.
Johnson v. State
No. 14-22-00135-CR 10/10/23
Issue:
In an aggravated assault of a security officer by threat case, did the trial court err in submitting a jury charge that did not include the statutory definition of security officer and instead stated that a security officer is a public servant?
Holding:
Yes. The evidence was insufficient to establish the complainant was a security officer, and the trial court erred in its submission of the jury charge. The charge failed to include the statutory definition of security officer and erroneously instructed that a security officer is a public servant; it also repeatedly misrepresented the charged offense as aggravated assault on a public servant rather than the actual charged offense of aggravated assault on a security officer. The court modified the judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. Read opinion.
Commentary:
In this case, the State was forced to concede that it had presented no evidence on whether the victim was a “security officer,” as that term is defined in the assault statute. The court of appeals also noted that a “security officer” is not necessarily a “public servant.” The State is required to prove these material elements that it has pleaded. The defendant still clearly committed the offense of aggravated assault—by pointing a rifle at someone—so he will face punishment for that offense in a new punishment hearing.