Texas Court of Appeals
Teague v. State
No. 06-24-00165-CR 4/20/26
Issue:
May a defendant, determined to be indigent for purposes of appointment of counsel, be assessed and ordered to pay all or part of his appointed attorney fees at a future date?
Holding:
Yes. The Court rejected the defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s finding that he had the ability to offset the cost of his appointed trial counsel. “The record shows that, at the time he was provided appointed trial counsel, [the defendant] did not have a job and had no income. The record also shows that between then and sentencing, [he] got a job and had been working for approximately two years. For that and other reasons, we find that there was a basis for the trial court’s order that [he] reimburse Gregg County for the expenses of appointed trial counsel.” The Court also concluded that a challenge to trial counsel reimbursement does not require proof of cash on hand in the dollar amount of the reimbursement ordered, nor is a trial judge required to find that the defendant was willing to pay. Read opinion.
Concurrence (Van Cleef, J.):
“It is unfortunate that my esteemed colleagues and I cannot reach a consensus on the law in this case, but it is not surprising. We have each attempted to span the gap between longstanding practice and Articles 42.15 and 42.16 on one hand, and Articles 26.04 and 26.05(g)–(g-1) on the other, just as the trial courts in our district do, against a backdrop of cases that variously pre- and post-date a major statutory change. My conclusions rely heavily on the Legislature’s addition of Article 26.05(g-1) and on the other legislation cited in this concurrence.”
Dissent (Stevens, C.J.):
“The trial court made the finding in its judgment that [the defendant] had the ability to pay attorney fees in part or in whole. However, I believe such a finding is unsupported by any factual basis in the record.” The dissent would modify the trial court’s judgment and bill of costs by deleting the assessment of attorney fees.
Commentary:
This is a very unusual decision that turns largely on the amendment to Art. 26.05(g-1), giving a trial court the ability to observe a change in circumstances in the defendant’s financial situation to impose a reimbursement fee for the cost of the defendant’s appointed attorney. This decision is even more unusual in that it has three opinions from a three-judge panel: the opinion of the court, a concurring opinion (which seems to join the opinion of the court), a dissenting opinion, and a concurring opinion written by the author of the opinion of the court, suggesting that the court need not have addressed any of these issues because the defendant did not challenge anything related to his conviction or his sentence. Because of the division among these opinions, the Court of Criminal Appeals may review this decision. The opinion of the lower court is extremely thorough, both in its statutory analysis and its treatment of the related case law, covering many complex issues.
Attorney General Opinion Requests
No. RQ-0642-KP 4/16/26
Issue:
If a county auditor did not initially allot earned interest to the correct account, does that constitute a “substantial risk of loss” as contemplated by Penal Code §32.45(b)? Read opinion request.
Requested by:
David Willborn, Guadalupe County Attorney
No. RQ-0644-KP 4/17/26
Issue:
Does a disaster proclamation issued under Gov’t Code §418.016(a), without express reference to Health & Safety Code §193.010, operate to suspend or modify the procedural requirements of §193.010? If so, what legal standards govern the issue of death certificates by catastrophe while a disaster proclamation is pending? Read opinion request.
Requested by:
Heather Stebbins, Kerr County Attorney
No. RQ-0641-KP 4/16/26
Issue:
May a commissioners court use its general control over county buildings to prohibit security measures that an auditor deems necessary to fulfill her statutory duty to protect sensitive records from unauthorized access? Read opinion request.
Requested by:
Cheryll A. Jones, Kinney County Auditor