Texas Courts of Appeals–Criminal
State v. Momin
No. 14-25-00020-CR 6/11/26
Issue:
Was the defendant entitled to a new trial under Brady v. Maryland when the State failed to disclose evidence unknown to it—that the Department of Public Safety’s crime laboratory analyst was under investigation by DPS for subpar work and mishandling evidence in other criminal cases?
Holding:
Yes. After being convicted of DWI, the defendant filed a motion for new trial when his attorney learned that another district attorney’s office had issued a Brady notice in an unrelated criminal case regarding the blood analyst who worked on evidence in the defendant’s case. The trial judge granted the defendant’s motion for new trial, finding that while there was no prosecutorial misconduct in this case, the defendant could have used the DPS investigations as mitigating or exculpatory evidence, and the trial court may have considered the investigations in ruling on the defendant’s motion to suppress the blood test results in his DWI trial. “Evidence of [the analyst’s] quality incidents would have established a pattern of mistakes and violations of standard operating procedures for the jury to consider in determining whether to find his work product and test results reliable to convict [the defendant].” The court of appeals concluded that under Brady, the evidence was both material and favorable, and the trial court appropriately granted the motion for new trial. Read opinion.
Commentary:
This is a decision rendered solely under Brady v. Maryland, as neither the court nor the parties referenced Art. 39.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As such, this case is not controlled by Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in Heath, which is currently under review. The court’s analysis solely addressed and rejected the State’s claims that this evidence was not favorable to the defendant and was not material to the defendant’s case. With regard to the favorability portion, the court found that the analyst’s poor performance in other cases was admissible. On that issue, the court of appeals was forced to distinguish this case from several decisions issued by the Court of Criminal Appeals, the most recent of which was Diamond v. State. One of the key factors in support of the court’s decision in this case could be the fact that this was a State’s appeal, so it is unclear whether the Court of Criminal Appeals will want to review this decision.
McGruder v. State
No. 07-24-00413-CR 6/9/26
Issue:
Did the trial judge correctly deny the defendant’s motion for a sanity evaluation when the defendant requested appointment of a disinterested expert to evaluate his sanity at the time of the charged offenses, then refused to cooperate with the evaluation?
Holding:
Yes. The defendant’s refusal to cooperate effectively waived his right to a sanity evaluation. The Court distinguished the appointment under Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 46C.101(a) of a disinterested expert to evaluate sanity from the appointment of a psychiatric expert to assist the defense team: An Art. 46C.101 expert does not assist the defense team but instead identifies for the parties whether sanity will be a significant factor at trial. After arrest, the defendant was determined to be incompetent to stand trial, so a sanity evaluation was precluded at that time under Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 46C.103(b). Once the defendant was restored to competency, the judge appointed a second sanity expert, but the defendant refused to cooperate and “objected to questioning regarding [his] state of mind while he was committing the charged offenses because the questions were ‘assuming that he did commit the offenses, and his position is he did not.’” The Court concluded that “the explanations for [the defendant’s] refusal to participate in [his] sanity evaluation illustrate that [he] made a knowing and voluntary waiver of any right to a sanity evaluation which might have attached.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
This decision should be helpful in light of the sparse case law that has construed Chapter 46C since its enactment, especially in a case with a defendant who is refusing to cooperate. Prosecutors should also watch this decision to see if it is reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals. Under normal circumstances, a prosecutor should be reluctant to endorse a trial court’s decision to deny an evaluation. But a defendant’s failure to cooperate will make it impossible to determine the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the offense.
Texas Court of Appeals–Civil
Hays County, et al. v. Carnes, et al.
No. 15-25-00121-CV 6/9/26
Issue:
Did a trial court improperly void a county bond election on road improvements based on an alleged Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA) violation?
Holding:
Yes. “First, until last year TOMA required two agenda postings: one on a courthouse bulletin board and one online. The latter disclosed all the information required by TOMA. Reading the two together (especially the online version most everyone would actually access), we hold the trial court erred by finding a TOMA violation. Second, even if our reading is incorrect (citation omitted), the four complaining plaintiffs forfeited their TOMA complaint by waiting to file it until voting started.” The Court noted that TOMA expressly provides only two remedies: a writ of mandamus or an injunction to stop, prevent, or reverse a TOMA violation. “When either would impede an election, courts are rightfully reluctant to intervene, and will not do so when a complaining party has strategically delayed filing until the election has begun.” The Court also concluded that the plaintiffs could not revive the same TOMA complaint months after the election, after the county had filed suit under the Expedited Declaratory Judgment Act seeking to validate the bonds. “It is one thing to set aside a local ordinance for violating TOMA; local officials will simply have to try again. But it is quite another to set aside the results of an election in which 64,599 voters (55.8 percent of those voting) approve road bonds with plenty of notice about the projects they were voting for. It appears that no Texas court has ever overturned the results of a general election due to a TOMA violation arising not from the election itself, but [from] an agenda posted months before about whether to hold it. We will not be the first.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
As declared by the majority opinion, this is a case of first impression. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the relators/plaintiffs did not act diligently in pursuing mandamus relief. The action was filed on the day that early voting began, even though it is clear that at least some of the relators were aware of the substance of the bond election. The trial court’s order voiding the election occurred eight months after the election. The Texas Supreme Court may want to review the very short holding that there was no TOMA violation by the two postings in this case. But it seems clear that the lawsuit to declare the election void was filed far too late.
<Please note that TDCAA’s office will be closed tomorrow, June 19, in observance
of the “Juneteenth” holiday>