15th Court of Appeals
Texas Department of Public Safety, et al. v. Texas Tribune, et al.
No. 15-24-00010-CV 3/6/26
Issue:
Did the trial court properly rule that the Department of Public Safety (DPS) and local district attorney were required to release information related to the Uvalde school shooting to various news organizations under the Public Information Act (PIA)?
Holding:
No. After DPS withheld information from the investigation that had been requested under the PIA, the news organizations sought a writ of mandamus to compel DPS to disclose the information. The Court noted that the PIA requests “are not of ordinary scope. The responsive information constitutes approximately 2.8 terabytes of data. … Nor was there anything ordinary about the timing of the PIA requests. The news organizations began making the PIA requests mere days after the mass shooting—when the investigation was in its earliest stages, before the relevant law enforcement authorities determined whether to charge any of the hundreds of persons on campus for acts related to the extraordinary loss of life, and before the relevant authorities determined whom to charge in the event that such prosecutions were warranted.” The trial judge granted summary judgment requiring all of the requested information to be released by DPS, subject to certain redactions, and rejected DPS’s invocation of the law enforcement exception in Gov’t Code §552.108. The 15th Court concluded that DPS had sufficiently shown that the law enforcement exception applied and that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment requiring disclosure of materials that did not exist or were not yet in DPS’s possession, as well as records DPS obtained from federal sources. “Significantly, we do not hold that each file and video clip contained in the massive volume of responsive information is forever shielded from public view. Rather, we conclude that DPS cleared the bar of defeating a summary judgment with respect to the responsive information and is entitled to proceed to a trial. At trial, DPS will bear the burden of proving that the information sought qualifies for the law enforcement exception to disclosure. But that was not DPS’s burden at this early juncture.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
At the center of this case is the eternal conflict between the media’s desire to timely report on crimes and other current events (with media outlets competing with each other to be the first to offer breaking news or factual details), and the needs of law enforcement and prosecuting authorities to conduct investigations and make prosecutorial decisions without any undue interference that media involvement may produce (for example, if a news report tips off a potential suspect, and the suspect then flees, tampers with evidence, etc.).
The law-enforcement exception to the PIA serves as an important safeguard, helping prevent law enforcement and prosecuting authorities from being compelled to release to the media—at least temporarily—certain information when doing so would interfere with a law enforcement investigation or the prosecution of a crime. If you have a case involving a PIA request from the media and think that the law-enforcement exception applies, read this opinion. It is long and the underlying subject matter is tragic, but it is thorough and educational.
Texas Courts of Appeals
Ex parte Mimms, et al.
No. 01-24-00198-CR 3/5/26
Issue:
May a defendant appeal an associate judge’s written order denying the defendant’s habeas application asserting actual innocence under CCP Art. 11.072?
Holding:
No. Art. 11.072 requires a written order from the presiding judge of the trial court for an appeal. Seven defendants were convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child and completed eight-year deferred adjudication supervision. About 30 years later, they filed Art. 11.072 habeas applications, claiming the prosecutions arose from the “Satanic Panic or Daycare Panic” controversy in the 1980s and that they were actually innocent. The appeals were referred to an associate judge, who denied the applications via written orders, and the defendants appealed. The State moved to dismiss the appeals, arguing that under the reasoning of Ex parte Sinclair, 693 S.W.3d 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024), Art. 11.072 requires a written order from the trial judge. The 14th Court of Appeals agreed. While the associate judge was authorized to hold a hearing and make findings of fact, she was not authorized to sign written orders denying the habeas applications. Read opinion.
Commentary:
A successful appeal requires, as a first step, a proper appealable order, which must: make a definitive ruling, is in writing, and is made by the appropriate judicial authority (i.e., the trial court judge, not an associate or magistrate judge to whom the trial court has referred the case for limited purposes). Without a proper appealable order, the jurisdiction “baton” does not pass to the appellate court, and the appellate court must dismiss the appeal.
Great work by the State here, convincing the 14th Court of Appeals to adopt and apply the reasoning of the lead opinion in Sinclair, which is a fractured, plurality opinion. Hopefully, other intermediate appellate courts will follow suit, which will supply the operational guidance that the CCA’s non-binding plurality opinion did not, albeit in a piecemeal fashion.
Ex parte Martinez
No. 03-25-00314-CR 3/4/26
Issue:
Does the deadline for the requirement under CCP Art. 17.151 that the State announce ready for trial within 90 days apply to criminal actions or criminal episodes?
Holding:
Criminal actions. “Because the plain language of Art. 17.151 applies to ‘criminal actions,’ and not ‘criminal episodes,’ a separate 90-day deadline applies to each newly charged offense that may be prosecuted independently and result in an additional punishment from the previously charged offenses. However, neither the statute nor our holding authorizes indefinite detention.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
This opinion is clear, concise, and soundly reasoned based on the plain language of Penal Code §§3.01 and 3.02 (which differentiate between a solitary “criminal action” and a “criminal episode” encompassing two or more offenses that are connected or repeated) and Article 17.151 (which measures the 90-day ready-for-trial deadline “based on ‘the criminal action for which [the defendant] is being detained’”). If a defendant who is detained on multiple charges with different arrest dates objects to his continued pretrial confinement on the basis of Article 17.151, keep this opinion handy and be prepared to argue that each discrete offense gets its own 90-day timeline.
Boehm v. State
No. 03-24-00357-CR 3/6/26
Issue:
Does Penal Code §42.092 (cruelty to animals) allow conviction based on a recklessness standard?
Holding:
Yes. The Court rejected the veterinarian defendant’s argument that §42.092 required proof that she intentionally or knowingly failed (knowing the failure was unreasonable) to provide care she knew was required to maintain in good health a dog boarding in her clinic. “We disagree with [the veterinarian’s] underlying premise that a person cannot recklessly (or intentionally) unreasonably fail to provide necessary food, water, care, or shelter for an animal in the person’s custody. We will not write the reckless mens rea out of the statute based on the definitions set out in [Penal Code §]6.03.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
Justice for Jax! In reaching this decision, the appellate court considers how Penal Code §§42.092(b) and 6.03 relate to each other and expresses that it is “a matter of semantics” as to whether a crime under §42.092(b) is deemed a “nature of conduct,” a “circumstances surrounding conduct,” or a “result of conduct” offense for purposes of §6.03. The appellate court’s interpretation of Penal Code §§42.092(b) and 6.03 aims to give full effect to the Legislature’s deliberate inclusion of recklessness as an applicable mens rea for the commission of the offense of cruelty to a non-livestock animal under §42.092(b), regardless of any restrictions that the definitions listed in §6.03 might impose. This seems logical, in light of the plain language of §42.092(b), but if the defendant seeks discretionary review, we’ll see if the CCA agrees.