5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
L.M.L. v. Martin
No. 26-50418 5/29/26
Issue:
Can Texas enforce the provisions of SB 4 notwithstanding a stay issued by a federal district court?
Holding:
Yes. A three-judge panel of the 5th Circuit granted an opposed motion for stay of the injunction pending appeal, leaving the provisions of SB 4 enforceable and allowing officers to arrest people they believe may have crossed the border illegally. The federal district court’s May 14 decision had previously prevented enforcement of most of the provisions of SB 4 (specifically, enforcing Penal Code §§51.03 and 51.04 and Code of Criminal Procedure Arts. 5B.002 and 5B.003; read a summary of the district court’s decision here.) The plaintiffs had filed suit on pre-emption grounds against SB 4’s re-entry and removal provisions, which make it a crime for noncitizens to enter, attempt to enter, or be found in Texas after they have “been denied admission to” or removed from the United States while an order of removal is outstanding.
Commentary:
The panel’s one-sentence order granting the motion to stay—without any analysis—means that Texas prosecutors can pursue prosecutions under §§51.03 and 51.04 and can enforce Arts. 5B.002 and 5B.003. But proceed with caution until a formal decision on the merits is made in this case. Because there was no analysis, the federal panel (with one dissenting justice) may just have been giving deference to a law passed by a state legislature while the litigation regarding that law still continues. There is still much litigation to come on SB 4, and a final ruling has not been made.
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Baptiste v. State
No. PD-0449-25 6/4/26
Issue:
Does Tex. Gov’t Code Ch. 54A allow an associate judge to preside over voir dire proceedings?
Holding:
Because the defendant did not object at trial, he did not preserve his complaints for appellate review, and the Court did not decide the issue. “In this case, [the defendant] does not challenge either (1) the district judge’s authority over the case or (2) the associate judge’s qualifications to be an associate judge, nor does [the defendant] contend that the associate judge performed an act unauthorized under the Government Code. [The defendant] simply challenges the constitutionality of two statutes for the first time on appeal and attempts to backdoor his challenges as ‘void judgment’ claims in order to sidestep Karenev [v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)]. We reject [the defendant’s] attempts to do so.” The Court concluded that because Tex. Gov’t Code §§54A.006 and 54A.008 have not been declared unconstitutional, it must presume their constitutionality, and therefore, the defendant forfeited his claim by failing to object. Read opinion.
Concurrence (Parker, J.):
“In a nutshell, the dissent misconstrues Karenev, misunderstands Texas law on procedural default, misunderstands pretrial habeas, and misconstrues the federal magistrate cases. And with or without Karenev, [the defendant’s] claim here was forfeitable and was in fact forfeited by [the defendant’s] failure to object.” Read concurrence.
Dissent (Schenck, P.J., joined by Walker, J. on Parts I & II):
The dissent would hold that associate judges are not “judges” within the meaning of Texas Constitution and agreed with the defendant that Gov’t Code §54A.006(d) unconstitutionally permits an associate judge to “select a jury” in a felony trial. “We should not ignore our Constitution’s assignment of judicial power or its restrictions on its reassignment to others. Appellant’s jury selection process took place under a statutory mechanism failing to fit within this framework insofar as it neither required nor invited his consent, resulting in a structural error and voidable judgment. I would reach the error and correct it.” Read dissent.
Commentary:
The relatively short majority decision centers only on whether the alleged error was preserved. The issue on the merits dealt with the ability of an associate judge to take certain actions that some might consider “judicial,” such as preside over jury selection. Both parties briefed that issue, and the dissent discusses why the Court should have decided the issue. But the resolution of that issue, and the constitutionality of the controlling statutes, will have to wait for another case. The majority opinion is a straightforward decision on preservation of a constitutional claim and the court’s prior decision in Karenev. Because the defense did not object, the issue could not be raised for the first time on appeal.
Texas Courts of Appeals
Castille v. State
No. 01-24-00418-CR 5/28/26
Issue:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by allowing a defendant charged with murder, who was a paraplegic and wheelchair-bound, to be shackled at the legs during his trial without making any particularized findings but deferring to a sheriff’s office policy to keep him shackled?
Holding:
Yes, but the error was harmless. The Court noted that the U.S. Constitution forbids routine and visible shackling of a defendant during a criminal jury trial, but this right to be shackle-free can be overcome by essential state interests, such as physical security, escape potential, and courtroom decorum. In this case, “[w]ithout making any particularized findings, or identifying an essential state interest, the trial court ordered a paraplegic man shackled at the legs during his criminal trial. The trial court’s error is serious. However, we are required to review the error for harmlessness.” The Court concluded that because the defendant admitted to shooting the victim in the course of a robbery, he did not argue that he committed the crime in self-defense, and the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, the error was harmless. Read opinion.
Commentary:
Shackling a defendant must be based upon specific findings regarding that particular defendant and why shackling is necessary. A general policy of the judge or the local sheriff is not sufficient. The court of appeals did not address whether they believed that the jury observed the defendant in shackles. Instead, the court of appeals held that the defendant was not harmed because of the strength of the State’s case against him. The bottom line is that if the judge or sheriff insists on having a defendant shackled while he is in the courtroom, they need to read this decision (and the decisions that it follows) regarding what findings must be made before shackling can occur.
Renteria Garcia v. State
No. 01-24-00388-CR 5/28/26
Issue:
Did the trial court improperly deny the defendant’s motion for mistrial after an alternate juror mistakenly participated in deliberations during the guilt-innocence phase of trial?
Holding:
No. The defendant was charged with first-degree felony continuous sexual abuse of a child. After closing arguments, a 12-member jury deliberated for about 10 hours before returning a guilty verdict. After learning that one of the alternate jurors had participated in deliberations by mistake, the trial court ordered that the alternate be released and the correct juror rejoined the jury so that it could deliberate guilt or innocence anew. The reconstituted jury deliberated for about 35 minutes before returning a guilty verdict. The same jury deliberated on punishment and imposed a 30-year prison sentence.
The defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing that given the short time it had taken the reconstituted jury to reach its verdict, they couldn’t have deliberated in the same detail the jury had done in reaching the first verdict. Citing Becerra v. State, 685 S.W.3d 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024), the Court concluded that an alternate’s participation in deliberation might violate Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 36.22 but generally will not rise to a constitutional violation. “Here, there is no showing that a substantial right was affected by the trial court’s decision to allow the jury to start deliberations anew with Juror 29. Juror 29 and the alternate who deliberated heard the same evidence as the remaining seated jurors. After the alternate juror was released and Juror 29 substituted in her place, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard their previous deliberations and to begin their deliberations anew, and it is presumed that the jurors did just that. [The defendant’s] argument on appeal that Juror 29 was pressured into ratifying the previous guilty verdict is entirely speculative.” Read opinion.
Commentary:
This decision is fundamentally a finding that the defendant was not harmed by the statutory error of allowing a non-juror (an alternate juror) to be present during the actual jury’s deliberations. But perhaps another takeaway from this decision is that the parties, the trial judge, and the bailiff should ensure that the 12 people who go into the jury room during deliberations are the first 12 people who were selected to be on the jury and that any alternate jurors do not. In this case, the trial judge accepted the State’s suggestion that the correct 12 people begin deliberations all over again, and the correct 12 people ended up reaching the verdict. This decision may get reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals, but this decision appears to be faithful to the court’s prior holding in Becerra.