Texas Attorney General Opinions
KP-0478 1/27/25
Issue:
Does Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 39.14 apply to third-party records in the possession of a local juvenile justice agency and used in support of its social history report to a juvenile court?
Conclusion:
At a disposition hearing conducted under Family Code §54.04, a juvenile court may consider a social history report prepared by a juvenile probation officer. A local juvenile probation department is not “the State” for purposes of Art. 39.14 and not subject to disclosure duties on that basis. Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 2A.209 also does not require a local juvenile probation department to disclose documents used to prepare social history reports to the prosecution because juvenile services does not meet the statutory definition of “law enforcement agency.”
Family Code §54.04(b) requires that a child’s attorney be given access to documents appended to a social history report. Section 54.04(b) does not apply to documents that are not considered by a juvenile court at the disposition hearing. A child’s attorney may subpoena confidential or privileged documents used to prepare a social history report pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 24.02. These documents are subject to mandatory in-camera review before disclosure if favorable to the child and otherwise to permissive in-camera review in relation to deciding a motion to quash.
The AG’s Office also concluded that determining whether these documents must be disclosed under Brady v. Maryland is a fact-specific inquiry that cannot be addressed in an Attorney General opinion. Read opinion.
Requested by:
Phil Sorrells, Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney
Commentary:
Here, the AG’s Office (OAG) expresses its positions that a local juvenile probation department is not part of the “state” for purposes of Article 39.14; is not a law enforcement agency for purposes of Article 2A.209; and is often not part of the “prosecution team” for purposes of Brady, although it could be in some cases. In doing so, the OAG applies narrow interpretations of the relevant terms, especially of “state,” which the OAG asserts applies only to “the prosecution representing the State of Texas in criminal cases,” not to all possible state actors.
Be cautious with this opinion and its implications for discovery obligations under those authorities, though, because AG opinions are persuasive authority only and are not binding on courts. Further, this OAG opinion appears to go against the prevailing approach adopted by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and other appellate courts, who interpret at least the term “state” in its broadest sense and, thus, hold the prosecution to a more onerous discovery obligation than the OAG might. See, e.g., State v. Heath, 696 S.W.3d 677, 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (“Any general reference to the ‘state’ refers to the State of Texas in its broadest sense…[a]nd in doing so, it places a duty to disclose upon the prosecutor as well as law enforcement”).
KP-0479 1/27/25
Issue:
Does a sheriff have authority to contract with other local governments and private entities for off-duty work of sheriff deputies?
Conclusion:
Only the commissioners court may generally contract for providing law enforcement services involving county business. Texas law recognizes the practice of law enforcement officers providing private-security services, outside of that provided to a county, for direct compensation. The status of a school district as a political subdivision does not affect its statutory authority to directly contract for private-security services by a law enforcement officer. No statute requires provision of private-security services only for the presence of a mass gathering of people. Read opinion.
Requested by:
Cindy Havelka, Fayette County Auditor