Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Cyr v. State
No. PD-0257-21 12/21/22
Issue:
Was a mother charged with reckless injury to a child by omission entitled to a jury instruction under the concurrent causation provision of Penal Code §6.04(a) for acts “clearly insufficient” to cause brain hemorrhaging?
Holding:
No. The evidence did not raise the issue of concurrent causation under Penal Code §§6.04(a) and 22.04(a). Evidence that the defendant was not in the room where the injury occurred and may not have been aware of the father’s prior abuse of the victim “do not establish a concurrent cause, however, but are the very essence of the State’s case.” The court concluded that concurrent causation “should not be over construed to encompass culpability disputes appropriately addressed by the essential elements of the crime.” Read opinion.
Dissent (Yeary, J.):
“In its petition for discretionary review in this case, the State Prosecuting Attorney (SPA) urges the Court to hold that the ‘concurrent cause’ provision of Section 6.04(a) of the Texas Penal Code simply has no application to an offense that is committed by omission rather than by commission.… As I understand the Court’s opinion today, it implicitly rejects this categorical approach, but it concludes that [the defendant] has failed to point to any evidence in the case that would have justified the trial court in submitting a ‘concurrent cause’ instruction to the jury in any event. I disagree with both the SPA and the Court, and so I respectfully dissent.” Read dissent.
Commentary:
This decision details yet once again how incredibly difficult it is for a criminal defendant in Texas to succeed on a concurrent causation defense. But this is not a case about whether concurrent causation prevented the defendant from being guilty. This is instead a case about whether the defendant was entitled to a jury charge on concurrent causation and whether a fact issue was raised about whether her failure to act was clearly insufficient to cause the injury to the child/victim. In that respect, the majority noted that the defendant was not really arguing concurrent causation in her defense at trial. She was instead challenging her culpability, whether she was in fact reckless, and whether she was sufficiently aware of the co-defendant’s conduct. This decision should be very helpful in prosecutions of injury to a child by omission, and it can be quite helpful for other cases in which the defendant is arguing concurrent causation.
Ex parte Dennis
No. WR-89,188-01 12/21/22
Issue:
If a defendant files an application for post-conviction habeas relief alleging that he is physically confined pursuant to his conviction, must he allege further collateral consequences that flow from his conviction?
Holding:
No. The Court concluded that in these circumstances, it should treat the defendant’s pleadings as sufficient when they were filed and consider the merits of his claims under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.07. The Court, however, found that the defendant had failed to establish the first prong for ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland and denied relief. Read opinion.
Commentary:
This decision will be of interest only to prosecutors who handle applications for post-conviction writs of habeas corpus. At its foundation, the issue in this case is whether the defendant’s initial pleading was sufficient. The issue arose because the defendant’s sentence was discharged while his application was pending. But the defendant was still confined at the time he filed his application, so he did not need to allege collateral consequences or amend his application to allege collateral consequences.
Texas Courts of Appeals
Cordova-Lopez v. State
No. 01-20-00724-CR 12/20/22
Issue:
Does conducting a jury trial during the COVID-19 pandemic amount to structural error?
Holding:
No. Structural errors include a total deprivation of the right to counsel, lack of an impartial trial judge, denial of self-representation, denial of a public trial, and lack of proper reasonable doubt instruction. None of the defendants’ issue rose to the level of structural error. Read opinion.
Commentary:
The issue in this case is not whether “error” occurred. The issue in this case is whether “structural error” occurred—that is, error that is not subject to a harm analysis. As such, it is not clear whether this decision could be of any help in deciding whether a defendant’s right of confrontation was violated because a witness wore a mask, which was one of the defendant’s claims. Nevertheless, this decision should be quite helpful in litigating those cases in which the defendant claims that the trial should not have gone forward because of the COVID-19 pandemic. In that respect, the court of appeals also rejected the defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance.
Harris v. State
No. 01-20-00140-CR 12/15/22
Issue:
Did a judge’s failure to answer a question from the jury (“Does the admitted commission of a crime, sale of a controlled substance, negate the basis of a claim of self-defense?”) cause the defendant egregious harm?
Holding:
No. On rehearing en banc, the full court ruled that the trial judge was not required to give an instruction. “The instruction at issue accurately stated the law and is not confusing. [A]nswering the jury’s question would have impermissibly endorsed the defendant’s self-defense claim by deemphasizing that he was engaged in criminal activity when he used deadly force while emphasizing accomplices criminal conduct at the time.” Read opinion. (For the original panel opinion in this case, see the case summary from June 3, 2022.)
Dissent (Goodman, J.)
“The instruction did not answer the jury’s question. Proper instructions must give the jury all the applicable law, rather than supplying parts from which the jury may cobble together all the applicable law for itself. Answering the jury’s question would not have endorsed the defendant’s self-defense theory, and the trial court’s refusal to answer makes it impossible on appeal to tell whether the jury correctly applied the law.” Read dissent.
Dissent (Farris, J.)
“It is well settled that only evidence—not attorney argument—can put an issue in dispute. Because the evidence was undisputed that defendant was engaged in an illegal drug transaction, the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the presumption of reasonableness over defense counsel’s objection.” Read dissent.
Commentary:
As was the situation when the original decision in this case was issued in June, prosecutors should expect this decision to be reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals, even though the ultimate result has now changed. The majority’s analysis of the law on both the limited presumption of reasonableness and answering jury questions is sound. But there is obviously a significant dispute in this case, both legally and factually. The dispute arises over whether there was a fact issue as to whether—at time that the defendant purported to act in self-defense—the defendant was also committing the offense of possession of a controlled substance. The majority opinion held that there was a fact issue and, therefore, the jury should have been charged on the presumption of reasonableness. Justice Farris in dissent would hold that there was no such fact issue. Prosecutors should be very careful in relying upon this decision until the Court of Criminal Appeals has had a chance to decide whether to review it.
Last Case Summaries of 2022
This edition of Weekly Case Summaries is the last one of the year. We will resume case summaries on Friday, January 6, 2023. The TDCAA offices will be closed the week of December 26-30, 2022 and will re-open for business on Monday, January 2, 2023. Until then, happy holidays, Merry Christmas, and happy new year to all!