By Joshua Luke Sandoval
Assistant Criminal District Attorney in Bexar County
We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do other things not because they are easy but because they are hard,” —President John F. Kennedy, 1962.
With these words, President Kennedy inspired a nation, promising that these Unites States of America would land an astronaut on the moon within the decade. With great determination, the nascent space program was able to visit the moon in less than seven years.
Today, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has visited Moon not once, but twice in 15 years.[1] Though the high court’s journey has been far less publicized and perhaps slightly less thrilling, its analysis of this important case has had a monumental impact on juvenile law in Texas.
The scope of this article
This case contains a vast amount of information. Simply discussing the procedural posture of a case that has spanned well over 20 years can be quite the endeavor, let alone analyzing the pertinent facts and law therefrom. It is noteworthy that the Court of Criminal Appeals has analyzed different points of law both times it has heard Cameron Moon’s appeal. As such, the focus of this article will be the most recent iteration of Moon and what changes, if any, we can expect as Texas prosecutors. As a secondary focus I will also navigate some necessary background and reasoning. Additionally, I will highlight practical considerations, such as the process and considerations leading up to a waiver and transfer hearing.
Certification and transfer
Before addressing the rather unique history of this case, now is a good time to briefly go over the law regarding a motion to waive jurisdiction and transfer a case to an adult district court.
Whether one is accustomed to referring to these hearing as “certification and transfers,” “waiver and transfers,” “certifications,” or simply “C&Ts,” the process is the same and the purpose is fairly straightforward. Texas law provides for certain circumstances in which a juvenile district court can waive its exclusive jurisdiction over a respondent’s delinquent conduct and transfer said respondent to an adult district court for a criminal trial.
To even be eligible for waiver and transfer the respondent must be:
1) accused of a felony offense;
2) 14 years of age or older at the time he committed a capital felony, an aggravated controlled substance felony, or a felony of the first degree; or
3) 15 years of age or older at the time he committed a felony of the second degree, third degree, or state jail felony.
In addition, there cannot have been any adjudication hearing concerning the offense.[2]
Only respondents who fit into these specific parameters are eligible for waiver and transfer hearings.
Moreover, Texas prosecutors must take care to comport with the notice and procedural requirements outlined in the Family Code. A petition alleging delinquent conduct must be drafted, filed, and served on the respondent as well as his parent or guardian. Additionally, there must be a summons stating that the hearing is for the purpose of “considering discretionary transfer to criminal court.”[3]
Prior to the hearing, the court must order an investigation to determine if the waiver and transfer is appropriate. This investigation is required to include a “diagnostic study, social evaluation, and a full investigation for the child, his circumstances, and the circumstances of the alleged offense.”[4] Such information will help the court to properly apply the factual scenario to the necessary factors to be considered before waiving jurisdiction.
At the hearing itself, the court may consider live testimony from witnesses and reports from police officers, juvenile probation officers, or other experts. Yes, that’s correct, hearsay is admissible. The court must determine there is probable cause to believe the respondent committed the offense and “because of the seriousness of the offense alleged or the background of the child, the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings.”[5]
In reaching its conclusion, the court has the following list of factors to consider:
1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against the person;
2) the sophistication and maturity of the child;
3) the record and previous history of the child; and
4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court.[6]
Timeline
Now let’s turn our attention to the history of Moon, both the case and the man. The procedural posture of the Moon cases can be a little tricky because it has twice been through juvenile district court, once through an adult district court, twice through a court of appeals, and twice through the Court of Criminal Appeals. The appellant, Cameron Moon, is now over 30 years old. In the summer of 2008, he was charged with murder when he killed Christopher Seabrook in a drug deal that went wrong. At the time, he was 16 years old.
Due to his age, he was charged in a Harris County juvenile district court. In December of the same year, state prosecutors filed a motion asking the juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction and transfer the case to an adult district court. This motion was granted, and in spring of 2010, a jury convicted Moon of murder. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison.
At this point, the appellant contested his conviction, alleging that the juvenile court abused its discretion in waiving its jurisdiction. The First Court of Appeals agreed with him, finding the evidence legally and factually insufficient to support the juvenile court’s waiver of jurisdiction.[7] The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State’s petition for discretionary review and agreed with the Court of Appeals, reiterating the lower court’s conclusion that “the case remains pending in the juvenile court.”[8] Then, in a move that seemed destined to stir the pot, the CCA theorized that the State could start from square one and reattempt to certify, which would ostensibly correct the errors that both Courts had found in the first hearing.
To no one’s surprise, the State did indeed reinitiate waiver and transfer proceedings against the appellant. This move came in the wake of both the court of appeals and the CCA reasoning that jurisdiction remained with the juvenile district court based on the insufficiency of the first waiver and transfer hearing. The juvenile court had another hearing, and again waived its jurisdiction and transferred the appellant to adult district court.
Things proceeded somewhat differently this time around. After the juvenile court waived its jurisdiction and transferred Moon to the adult court, the appellant was indicted. In response, Moon immediately filed a pre-trial application for a writ of habeas corpus, which primarily attacked the issue of whether the legal criteria for waiver of jurisdiction and transfer had been met. The adult district court denied the writ, and Moon immediately filed an appeal with the court of appeals.
The First Court of Appeals looked at only two issues:
1) whether the appellant’s claims were cognizable in pre-trial habeas proceedings; and
2) whether the criteria of Family Code §54.02(j)(3), requiring the lack of previous “adjudication,” had been satisfied in the juvenile court, given the appellant’s previous prosecution in adult court for murder.[9]
The court of appeals sustained the appellant’s points of appeal and ordered the adult district court to dismiss the case based on a lack of jurisdiction. Which brings us to the newest iteration of Moon.
Moon II
The CCA granted discretionary review on three grounds raised by the State:
1) whether the appellant’s claim was cognizable;
2) whether the law-of-case doctrine did control in the case; and
3) whether the appellant, having benefited from prior iterations of Moon, should be estopped from now arguing that they were wrong.[10]
Additionally, the CCA asked both parties to brief another issue: “whether §54.02(j)(3)’s reference to an adjudication and an adjudication hearing have applicability beyond what those terms mean in the Family Code’s juvenile justice provisions themselves.”[11]
As an added wrinkle, Moon attacked the jurisdiction of the CCA to even hear the matter. Typically, in juvenile law matters, it is the Texas Supreme Court that has final appellate review, not the Court of Criminal Appeals. Moon argued that the applicable law vested the CCA with jurisdiction to hear a juvenile court’s waiver and transfer only once the accused was convicted or granted deferred adjudication. [12] As such, Moon argued that in this case jurisdiction would lie solely with the Texas Supreme Court.
Before I dive further into the CCA’s analysis on this matter, it is important to first look at the controlling statute, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 44.47. In 1995, the legislature drastically modified the manner in which a juvenile court’s waiver of jurisdiction and transfer to adult district court could be appealed. Previously, one could immediately appeal such a ruling to an intermediate court of appeals as a civil matter before the case took on its criminal aspect in adult district court. Effective January 1996, though, a new law, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 44.47, eliminated one’s right to immediately appeal a juvenile court’s waiver and transfer. As modified, the only right to appeal the ruling was upon conviction in the adult court or upon the granting of deferred adjudication.[13] In 2015, the legislature repealed Art. 44.47, making it moot September 1 of that year.[14] As we will see below, Moon’s case was controlled by the now-repealed statute.
The CCA’s analysis
Understandably, the CCA first directed its attention to the jurisdictional argument by analyzing the nature of the pre-trial habeas application. The Court paid special attention to word choice, pointing out that terms such as criminal trial, prosecute the appellant, and asking for the indictment to be dismissed all had significance.[15] In looking at the relief Moon sought, the CCA concluded it was of the nature that could “only be obtained in the context of a criminal case.”[16]
Next, in what could only be described as a gut punch to the appellant, the CCA turned the defendant’s jurisdictional argument on its head. When Moon focused on the propriety of the CCA’s jurisdiction, he unwittingly opened the door to the CCA questioning whether the court of appeals was initially able to review the appeal. Interpreting the former Art. 44.47, the CCA reasoned that it “limits a defendant’s appeal, of any kind, that challenges the validity of a juvenile court’s transfer order solely to the context of criminal post-conviction (or post-deferred adjudication) appellate review.”[17] At the time when his (second) waiver and transfer hearing was granted on May 7, 2015, former Art. 44.47 was still in effect. As such, his only course of action in challenging the juvenile court’s ruling would be to wait for a conviction in the adult court before appealing to the appropriate court of appeals. Circling back to its original point that the CCA had jurisdiction, the opinion states that once such a motion is granted, the matter becomes distinctly criminal in nature (moving to the adult court) and loses all the protections the juvenile system seeks to afford respondents.[18] As such, Moon was unable to initially bring his claim to the court of appeals.
Given its analysis and conclusions, the CCA did not need to address other matters brought by the appellant or the State.
How Texas prosecutors are affected
In the end, where does all this leave Texas prosecutors? Does this latest episode in a 15-year saga really end with an anticlimactic groan? Not necessarily. Although the Court of Criminal Appeals held the court of appeals should never have heard this second round of Moon because it lacked the proper jurisdiction, there are still tidbits of wisdom to take away.
For starters, Moon and its family tree had clearly taught us some important points about supposed best practices. Previous iterations of the case have held that to survive appellate scrutiny, trial courts need to enter case-specific findings in the record and in the order when granting waiver and transfer hearings.[19] These case-specific findings refer back to statutory factors that a court should consider in making its determination. However, the CCA has more recently looked at that issue and had a change of heart. In Ex parte Thomas, the Court held there was no statutory requirement in place requiring the trial court to “recite the underlying facts upon which its reason for transfer is based.”[20] This newer interpretation reasoned that the applicable law “allowed for findings” but didn’t mandate them.[21]
For all those who have handled such matters between the first Moon and Ex parte Thomas, I am sure there is still resonating concern that a waiver and transfer order will get sent back for failing to contain the fact-specific reasons. Whereas that seems highly unlikely given the decision in Ex parte Thomas, it is still important to remember best practices such as making a good and clear record. Additionally, whereas case law no longer requires the court to enter case-specific findings, it is important to still elicit thorough testimony from witnesses. It is still incumbent upon prosecutors to meet all statutory requisites for waiver and transfer, as well as show the court there is probable cause to believe the felony offense occurred.[22]
Furthermore, juvenile justice practitioners should not get lulled into a false sense of confidence with this most recent Moon decision. Moon’s case reaching the CCA under this scenario was impermissible at worst and premature at best. Impermissible because the statutory framework allowing an appeal of a waiver and transfer was not in place to benefit him (he missed the benefit of the new law by mere months). And premature because it seems likely that, upon conviction for murder, Moon could properly appeal the waiver and transfer along with any other issues that arise.
Closing thoughts
This latest Moon decision is a rather fact-specific opinion, as much of it turns on the timing of the waiver and transfer in relation to the former statute. It doesn’t help that this case has also been around since 2008. Laws change, and unusual cases have an uncanny way of popping up. After fifteen years of going back and forth, it’s hard to believe that Moon, the case that just doesn’t seem to go away, is quietly heading to the great emptiness of space.
Endnotes
[1] See generally Ex parte Moon, 667 S.W.3d 796 (tex. Crim. App. 2023).
[2] Tex. Fam. Code §54.02(a).
[3] Id. at (b).
[4] Tex. Fam. Code §54.02(d).
[5] Tex. Fam. Code §54.02(a)(3).
[6] Tex. Fam. Code §54.02 (f).
[7] Moon v. State, 410 S.W.3d 366, 378 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013).
[8] Moon v. State, 451 S.W. 3d 28, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
[9] Ex parte Moon, 649 S.W.3d 700, 716-17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022).
[10] Moon, PD-0302-22 at 7.
[11] Id.
[12] Id at 8.; and Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 44.45(b).
[13] Former Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 44.47.
[14] In a dreadful twist of irony, had the appellant been afforded the benefits of the repeal of Art. 44.47 and the new 2015 statute, he could have brought an immediate appeal to the appropriate court of appeals, not having to wait for the conviction in the adult court. The new statute also stated the court of appeals ruling would be subject to discretionary review by the Texas Supreme Court, not the Court of Criminal Appeals.
[15] All of these terms are reflective of an adult prosecution and not a juvenile case. In juvenile law the accused are referred to as respondents, and instead of indictments there are petitions filed alleging delinquent conduct.
[16] Moon, PD-0302-22 at 11.
[17] Moon, PD-0302-22 at 12.
[18] Moon, PD-0302-22 at 14.
[19] Moon v. State, 451S.W.3d 28, 50-51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
[20] Ex parte Thomas, 623 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
[21] Id.
[22] See generally Tex. Fam. Code §54.02.