A. BASED ON PUBLIC INTOXICATION THEORY

Pointer v. State, No. 05-09-01423-CR, 2011 WL 2163721 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2011, pdr ref’d).

Ogden v. State, No. 03-03-00190-CR, 2004 WL314916 (Tex.App,-Austin 2004, no pet.) (not designated for publication).

Chilman v. State, 22 S.W.3d 50 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d.)

Mathieu v. State, 992 S.W.2d 725 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.]1999, no pet.).

Porter v. State, 969 S.W.2d 60 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, pet. ref’d).

Jones v. State, 949 S.W.2d 509 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, no pet. h.).

Reynolds v. State, 902 S.W.2d 558 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d). 

Segura v. State, 826 S.W.2d 178 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, pet. ref’d).

Carrasco v. State, 712 S.W.2d 120 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986).

Warrick v. State, 634 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982).

Flecher v. State, 298 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.Crim.App. 1957). 

In accident case where officer did not see the defendant driving his car, the officer may still make a warrantless arrest of the DWI suspect pursuant to Article 14.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure under the authority of the public intoxication statute.

B. BASED ON “BREACH OF PEACE” THEORY

Gallups v. State, 151 S.W.3d 196 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004).

Kunkel v. State, 46 S.W.3d 328 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet.ref’d). 

Lopez v. State, 936 S.W.2d 332 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, pet. ref’d).

Romo v. State, 577 S.W.2d 251 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979). 

C. BASED ON “SUSPICIOUS PLACE” THEORY

  1. FRONT YARD
    • State v. Parson, 988 S.W.2d 264 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
      • Defendant whose vehicle was stopped in front yard = “suspicious place.”
  2. PARKING LOT
    • Cooper v. State, 961 S.W.2d 229 (Tex.App.-Houston 1st Dist.] 1997, pet ref’d). 
      • Officer arrived at scene of accident (in parking lot) and never saw suspect driving his vehicle but determined suspect was involved in accident. Court held detention and arrest were proper holding that it was reasonable for the officer to conclude that the parking lot, in front of a bar, in the wee hours of the morning, with bleeding people walking around wrecked cars and where suspect appeared intoxicated = Suspicious Place.
  3. HOSPITAL
    • Dyar v. State, 125 S.W.3d 460 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003).
      • Defendant was involved in a one car accident and was transported to a hospital where he was visited by an officer investigating the accident. The officer noted the following: a visible head injury, speech slurred, admission by Defendant that he had been partying with friends, odor of alcoholic beverage, defendant under 21 years of age. Placed Defendant under arrest and after reading him the DIC-24 Defendant agreed to give a blood specimen. Issue on appeal was whether this was a valid warrantless arrest and could a hospital be a “suspicious place”? Court holds that a hospital can be, and was a suspicious place, under the totality of the circumstances relied upon in this case.
  4. THE DEFENDANT’S HOME
    • Cook v. State, 509 S.W. 3d 591 ( Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2016)
      • This was a DWI case where officers arrived at the defendant’s home to investigate her possible involvement in a DWI crash. The court held that the defendant’s home was a suspicious place. Therefore, the warrantless arrest was justified. The court focused on the short time from from the 9-1-1 call, the defendant pulling into her garage, and the detectives arriving at the the defendant’s home. “Any place may become suspicious when a person at that location and the accompanying circumstances raise a reasonable believe that the person has committed a crime and exigent circumstances call for immediate action or detention by police.”
    • LeCourias v. State, 341 S.W.3d 483 (Tex.App.-Houston [14 Dist.] 2011).
      • In holding the warrantless arrest of the defendant was proper, the Court held that the area in front of the home where appellant was arrested was a “suspicious place” because the officer reasonably could believe, based on information provided by citizen that defendant drove while intoxicated, and it was necessary to take prompt action to ascertain appellant’s blood-alcohol level.
    • Gallups v. State, 151 S.W.3d 196 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004).
      • Defendant’s warrantless arrest in his home for driving while intoxicated (DWI) was not illegal. The evidence showed the defendant walked to his home after abandoning wrecked truck following accident short distance away. The home under these circumstances constituted a ”suspicious place,” when the police officer who responded noticed that defendant was bleeding from mouth. These circumstances also gave police officer reason to believe that defendant had committed breach of the peace.
  5. ACCIDENT SCENE
    • Polly v. State, No. 04-15-00792-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12508, 2016 WL 6885844
      • This case stands for the fact that DWI is a breach of the peace. A DWI involving an accident makes the accident scene a suspicious place.
    • Lewis v. State, 412 S.W.3d 794 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2013, no pet.).
      • In determining whether or not the scene of an accident could qualify as a “suspicious place” that would justify a warrantless arrest, the Court points out that any place may become suspicious for purposes of justifying a warrantless arrest based on probable cause, when an individual at the location and the accompanying circumstances raise a reasonable belief that the individual committed a crime and exigent circumstances call for immediate action or detention by the police. The scene in this case qualified because the Defendant voluntarily returned to the scene, admitted to being hit-and-run driver, admitted that she had too much to drink, and only 30 to 60 minutes elapsed between collision and Defendant’s return to scene.
    • State v. Rudd, 255 S.W.3d 293 (Tex.App.-Waco 2008, pet. ref¦d).
      • Contrary to Trial Court’s findings, the officer did not need to have even reasonable suspicion to talk with defendant at the accident scene and ask questions about the accident. In determining reasonable suspicion, the fact that an officer does not personally observe defendant operating motor vehicle is irrelevant as Article 14.03(a) (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent part that an officer may arrest a person found in a suspicious place under circumstances reasonably showing that he committed a violation of any of the intoxication offenses. The Court found that the Court’s excluding HGN because the officer did not videotape the testing was within its discretion and upheld that ruling.

D. NEED NOT ACTUALLY CHARGE SUSPECT WITH PUBLIC INTOXICATION

Peddicord v. State, 942 S.W.2d 100 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1997, no pet.).

Warrick v. State, 634 S.W.2d 707,709 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982).

There is no requirement that the officer actually arrest the defendant on public intoxication charge for the State to take advantage of the above mentioned theory. 

E. IMPLIED CONSENT LAW STILL APPLIES

Chilman v. State, 22 S.W.3d 50 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d.).

Arnold v. State, 971 S.W.2d 588 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.).

Elliot v. State, 908 S.W.2d 590 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, pet. ref’d).

While officer did not observe the defendant driving a motor vehicle and made a warrantless arrest for DWI pursuant to Article 14.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and under the authority of the public intoxication statute, the implied consent law was still applicable as it applies to person arrested for any offense arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated and is not limited to arrests for the offense of DWI. (See Section 724.011(a) of the Transportation Code.)