Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Jenkins v. State

No. PD-0086-18                       12/5/18

Issue:

Is an indictment that does not state the name of the accused in the body void on its face?

Holding:

No. Although Code of Criminal Proc. Art. 21.02 requires an indictment to contain the name of the accused, this defect does not automatically render the indictment void. A defective indictment may still be valid if “the face of the charging instrument is clear enough to give [a defendant] adequate notice of the charge against him.” Here, the defendant was given adequate notice by the caption of the indictment containing his name, address, and SID number. Read opinion.

Concurrence (Keller, P.J.):

“It is good that the Court holds that Cook has been implicitly disavowed by our more recent cases. Unfortunately, I cannot join the Court’s opinion because it is mistaken in describing our holding in Cook. … The Court errs in accepting the premise that a conviction is void if the charging instrument fails to name a specific person. As unsound as Cook was, even it did not go that far. Under the Court’s opinion, the conviction in this case would be void if Appellant’s name had not happened to appear elsewhere on the charging instrument. This is just the kind of result that the 1985 amendment to Article V, Section 12(b) of the Texas Constitution, and the enactment of [Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 1.14(b)] were intended to eliminate.” Read opinion.

Concurrence (Yeary, J.):

“I join the Court’s opinion today, with only one small caveat. The Court says: ‘In this case, the indictment did not “contain the name of the accused.”’ Majority Opinion at 11. This statement is true only as measured against the ‘specific formal requisites’ spelled out by statute. It is not an accurate statement, however, as measured against both Teal’s and Kirkpatrick’s assessments of the constitutional understanding of an indictment, which would include the broader ‘face’ of the indictment. If, when looking to ‘the indictment as a whole’—the ‘face’ of the indictment—it is possible to identify the name of the defendant,’ then we should just acknowledge that—for constitutional purposes—the indictment does ‘contain the name of the accused.’” Read opinion.

Commentary:

Do not read from the majority opinion that it is OK to omit the defendant’s name from the actual body of the indictment and just refer to the defendant as the “defendant.” It is not OK (at least according to the majority opinion). The fundamental issue in this case is whether that error is a “defect” to which the defendant must object or whether that error renders the indictment “void.” The court held that it was a defect. Because prosecutors should name the defendant in the body of the indictment, as required by Art. 21.02 at the very least, this issue should be rare. The most important thing about this decision may be that it will prevent a defendant or a court from further relying upon Cook v. State, which the court has disavowed.

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

In re State ex rel. Wice v. Fifth Judicial District Court of Appeals

No. WR-86,920-02                  11/21/18

Issue:

May a trial court pay an appointed prosecutor at a rate outside the fee schedule approved by the local judges?

Holding:

No. Under Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 26.05, a fee schedule must be set for payment of appointed attorney at either a fixed rate or a fixed range with minimum and maximum hourly rates. A county fee schedule may not include an “opt-out” provision that allows a judge to approve a different rate on a case-by-case basis. Read opinion.

Concurrence (Richardson, J.):

Although the judge did not have the authority to set a payment rate outside the fee schedule, the original payment that was approved by the commissioners court may not be rescinded, and the attorneys pro tem should be paid for all remaining work at a rate within the fee schedule. Read opinion.

Concurrence and Dissent (Yeary, J.):

“[T]he Court purports to ‘vacate the trial court’s second order for interim payment and order the trial court to issue a new order for payment of fees in accordance with a fee schedule that complies with Article 26.05(c) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.’ … [W]e are not called upon in this matter to order the trial court to do anything. In this mandamus proceeding, we are asked to compel the Fifth District Court of Appeals to, in essence, un-mandamus the trial court judge. For the reasons developed in the body of the Court’s opinion today, I agree we should not. Our disposition should simply announce that the mandamus relief Relator seeks is denied—period.” Read opinion.

Dissent (Alcala, J.):

“The court of appeals erred by holding that the trial judge had a ministerial duty to vacate his order paying the special prosecutors in the underlying case for their second voucher reflecting work they had already performed in accordance with the judge’s agreement to pay them at a special rate that the judge had determined was appropriate due to the complexity of the case and the prosecutors’ experience and ability. I would sustain [the] relator’s complaint that the Fifth Court of Appeals wrongfully ordered the trial court to vacate its payment of the second voucher.” Read opinion.

Dissent (Keel, J.):

“Collin County’s one-size-fits-some scheme makes it impossible to pay a reasonable attorney’s fee based on the variables listed in Article 26.05(a) in time-consuming and complex cases, and its fixed fee schedule fails to state reasonable fixed rates or minimum and maximum hourly rates as required by Article 26.05(c). Because of these defects in the fee schedule, the trial court was bound to violate either paragraph ‘a’ [payment of reasonable attorney’s fee] or paragraph ‘b’ [in accordance with the fee schedule] of the statute when it paid the attorneys pro tem in this case. That dilemma precludes mandamus because the trial court did not have a clear duty to sacrifice one part of the statute in favor of another.” Read opinion.

Dissent (Walker, J.):

 “The Commissioners Court was entitled to, at most, a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to amend its payment order. The Commissioners Court was not entitled to vacatur of the payment order, and the scope of the court of appeals’s writ is not appropriate. … Because the court of appeals’s writ of mandamus was too broad, it should not have been issued, and we should not let it stand. I would grant mandamus relief to Relator and issue a writ of mandamus directing the court of appeals to amend its prior writ. The court of appeals’s amended writ should direct the trial court to change its order of payment to one based upon [A]rticle 26.05(a), rather than one based on Local Rule 4.01(B), and to order payment of a reasonable fee in a manner consistent with this opinion.” Read opinion.

Commentary:

This case will impact only the relatively rare situation in which a non-prosecutor is appointed to be a prosecutor pro tem. Judge Newell’s majority opinion makes it clear that this decision is not intended to impact the compensation for indigent defense counsel because an analysis of such compensation would involve constitutional guarantees that are not involved in this case. Current prosecutors who are appointed to be prosecutors pro tem in another county are not entitled to compensation in addition to that which is paid to them as prosecutors. Judge Keel makes some good points with regard to the inherent conflicts in the controlling statutes, and that may be something that the Legislature will want to explore. The bottom line is that a fee schedule can be amended by the county’s judges to allow for a greater-than-usual payment in an appropriate case, but a greater-than-usual payment cannot be provided in a particular case by an individual judge outside the parameters of the fee schedule. This decision appears to bring this particular dispute in this very high-profile case to a close. More disputes are sure to come.

Lang v. State

No. PD-0563-17                       11/21/18

Issue:

May shoplifting by a defendant working alone constitute the offense of organized retail theft under Penal Code §31.16(b)?

Holding:

No. Legislative analysis shows that the organized retail theft statute does not target the conduct of ordinary shoplifters acting alone, but it was enacted to target professional theft rings. It requires proof of conducting, promoting, or facilitating some activity that is distinct from the act of theft itself. Read opinion.

Concurrence (Keller, P.J.):

“The organized retail theft statute says: ‘A person commits an offense if the person intentionally conducts, promotes, or facilitates an activity in which the person receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of … stolen retail merchandise.’ … Although terms in a statute can sometimes overlap, rendering the main verbs in a statute meaningless is an absurd result that the legislature could not have possibly intended. But that is exactly what happens if this statute is applied to a mere shoplifter. It is suggested that [the defendant] was not a mere shoplifter because she left the store with the items she stole. But the whole point of theft is to ‘deprive the owner of property.’ One does not expect a person who steals property from a store to remain in the store indefinitely, so leaving the store is not a sufficiently distinct act from the initial theft.” Read opinion.

Dissent (Yeary, J.):

“Here, the question is whether the reach of the organized retail theft statute extends to [the defendant’s] conduct. The court of appeals found that the language of the statute plainly did, and it declined to consult extra-textual factors to ‘construe’ that which it believed needed no construction. I agree that the meaning of the statute is plain on its face—though I believe its plain meaning to be different in an important respect from the court of appeals’s perception. Because I find the statutory language to be unambiguous, I disagree with this Court’s resort today to extra-textual factors. And because I believe the statute on its face plainly extends to proscribe [the defendant’s] conduct, I would ultimately affirm the court of appeals’s judgment.” Read opinion.

Commentary:

This case is an interesting bookend to the Court’s other opinion issued the same day regarding statutory construction (see Wice above). Here, the Court finds an ambiguity in the statutory language that allows use of the limited legislative history to resolve the ambiguity. Generally, the Texas Legislature has given us an excellent penal code. This statute may have alien DNA that led to the particular problem in this case. Prosecution under this statute requires an activity more than simple theft by a single person. Look instead for “fences” or persons assisting the thieves through other means as the targets for this statute. In most cases, Texas prosecutors (and justice) are best served by applying the plain language of the statute.

Texas Courts of Appeals

Speck v. State

No. 14-17-00755-CR               11/20/18

Issue:

Must a person driving in a lane that is not an “exit only” lane—but connects with an optional exit ramp—use a signal to indicate his intention to take the optional exit?

Holding:

Yes. Under Transportation Code §545.104(a), a driver is required to use a signal “to indicate an intention to turn, change lanes, or start from a parked position.” Here, the defendant was not required to exit the highway and could have continued driving straight along the highway but chose to shift to the exit ramp. This shift from one strip of roadway to another requires a signal. Read opinion.

Commentary:

This will be a valuable case because so many criminal cases begin with the investigation of a traffic offense.

Howard v. State

No. 01-18-00076-CR               11/27/18

Issue:

Does a warrantless search of a contraband phone found in a parolee’s possession violate the Fourth Amendment?

Holding:

No. Probation and parole supervision may impose reasonable conditions that deprive a defendant of some freedoms. Here, the defendant had a reduced expectation of privacy during his supervised residency at a halfway house, at which the rules prohibit the possession of unauthorized cell phones and permit searches of residents’ personal belongings. Given these terms of parole, the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a contraband cell phone, and the search did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. Read opinion.

Commentary:

This case may be of limited applicability, but it shows the value of thorough case investigation and preparation. By gathering and reviewing the defendant’s parole documents and halfway-house agreements, prosecutors found the combination of documents that defeated the defendant’s illegal search claim.

Announcements

Jury selection training

Registration for Jury Selection in Impaired Driving Prosecutions is now open. This free 4-hour program will be held in three cities (Richmond, Rockwall, and San Antonio) on Friday, December 7. More information and registration links are available here.

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Turner v. State

No. AP-76,580                    11/14/18

Issue:

Can a defendant obtain a new trial on direct appeal when his defense counsel conceded his guilt at trial against his wishes?

Is a retrospective competency trial feasible when the defendant’s claims of incompetency include delusions surrounding the facts of the case?

Holding:

Yes. Although ineffective assistance of counsel claims generally fail on direct appeal, the defendant’s claim that his counsel conceded guilt against his wishes was established in the trial record. Moreover, as announced in McCoy v. Louisiana, this is a federal structural error that cannot be forfeited. Thus, even though trial counsel’s strategy to concede guilt of the lesser-included offense of murder was far more rational than the defendant’s claim of a government conspiracy, whether to concede guilt is one of the few, core issues that the defendant alone could determine under the Sixth Amendment.

As to the defendant’s challenges to the trial court’s retrospective determination of his competence to stand trial, the feasibility of a retrospective competency trial depends on the quality and quantity of the evidence of competency given the passage of time since the trial. Here, the retrospective competency trial was to determine the defendant’s ability to effectively consult with counsel during his trial, a determination that could be made without consideration of the specific facts of the case. Additionally, the defendant was not entitled to a mistrial when one of the jurors in the competency trial admitted to reading an article about the previous case. Merely mentioning the nature of the crime for which the defendant was convicted is not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal when the juror did not share the information with other jurors and stated that he could put aside the information concerning the original trial as irrelevant to a competency determination. Read opinion.

Commentary:

The outcome of this case was dictated by a strategic decision of defense counsel that was defensible at the time based on existing Supreme Court precedent. This decision shows that any defendants who can make the same showing as the defendant here are likely to obtain new trials. Otherwise, the case is useful if you are required by an appellate court to litigate a retrospective competency claim.

Announcements

There will be no case summaries next week. Happy Thanksgiving!

NCFI Prosecutor Courses

Applications are now being accepted for the National Computer Forensics Institute prosecutor courses. All costs, including travel, are covered through the Federal government. The deadline to apply is November 26, 2018. Program dates and application information available here.

Jury selection training

Registration for Jury Selection in Impaired Driving Prosecutions is now open. This free 4-hour program will be held in three cities (Richmond, Rockwall, and San Antonio) on Friday, December 7. More information and registration links are available here.

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Johnson v. State

No. PD-0197-17                 11/7/18

Issue:

Is evidence that the defendant, a funeral home director, was unable to perform cremations and had on multiple occasions given customers the cremated remains of the wrong bodies sufficient to prove theft by accepting payments for unperformed cremation services?

Holding:

Yes. In a theft case arising from a contract, the State must prove that the defendant intended to deprive the owner of the property when it was taken. Here, the defendant knew he was unable to obtain death certificates, which are required to perform cremations, starting a week before he accepted payment from the victim. The defendant on multiple occasions gave customers the remains of a different body that had been cremated months earlier. Cremated remains are not fungible and the use of different remains to deceive customers shows an intent not to properly cremate and return the remains for which he was paid. Read opinion.

Concurrence (Yeary, J.):

The evidence was legally sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. However, the majority opinion incorrectly construes Penal Code §7.02(a)(2) by allowing the defendant to be found criminally responsible for the noncriminal conduct of another person. The defendant is more appropriately held liable for his wife’s actions (depositing the checks with no knowledge of the theft in obtaining them) under Penal Code §7.02(a)(1), which provides for vicarious criminal responsibility for a person who causes “an innocent or nonresponsible person to engage in conduct prohibited by the definition of the offense.” Read opinion.

Concurrence (Walker, J.):

“In discussing whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict on Count I, the majority and Judge Yeary’s concurring opinions consider whether the evidence was sufficient to show that [the defendant] was guilty as a party either under [Penal Code §]7(a)(2) as charged, or under a §7(a)(1) theory, respectively. However, the indictment did not charge [the defendant] as a party. The indictment alleged that [the appellant] committed the offense as a primary actor, and the jury’s instructions authorized his conviction not just as a party but also as a primary actor. … The evidence is sufficient on the theory that [the defendant] was guilty as a primary actor, and for that reason I concur in the Court’s decision to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.” Read opinion.

Commentary:

Cases like this exist in that fuzzy border zone between civil disputes and crimes. The macabre facts aside, look to this case for its key facts that made the State’s evidence sufficient to show a crime rather than a breach of contract.

Traylor v. State

No. PD-0967-17                 11/7/18

Issue:

Was a jury note showing the nature of the jury’s voting breakdown an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes for the charged offense even though a mistrial was declared after the jury deadlocked?

Holding:

No. The jury foreperson communicated to the judge that the jury was unanimous against guilt on the charged offense but deadlocked on the lesser-included offense. After additional hours of deliberation, the judge questioned the foreperson and confirmed that the jury was still deadlocked on the lesser-included offense. The jury’s note lacks the “finality necessary to constitute an acquittal” on the charged offense because the jury continued deliberating after the reported vote count and no indication was given whether the vote on the charged offense remained unanimous. Additionally, the jury did not fill out any of the certificates on the Court’s charge because, as reported by the foreperson, they had “no decision.” Read opinion.

Commentary:

Here, the Court reconciled multiple existing Texas precedents with the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Blueford v. Arkansas, 566 U.S. 599 (2012). Although a jury can informally acquit a defendant in some circumstances, the facts in this case were even less persuasive than those the Supreme Court rejected in Blueford. A jury charge that is properly constructed under Barrios v. State, 283 S.W.3d 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) means that a jury need not acquit of a greater offense before considering a lesser-included offense.

Texas Courts of Appeals

Martinez v. State

No. 13-17-00475-CR                         11/1/18

Issue:

Is showing that a defendant on probation had some income in months that he made no payments sufficient to prove that he had the ability to make payments and revoke probation for failure to do so?

Holding:

No. A source of income is just one factor when determining a defendant’s ability to pay community supervision fees. Here, the defendant testified that he had several different jobs over the probationary period, but he “kept getting let go or laid off.” The State presented no evidence about how much disposable income the defendant would have considering bills and other expenses. Read opinion.

Commentary:

This is a fact-bound decision that shows the difficulties inherent in revoking a probationer solely for failure to pay program fees.

State v. Heath

No. 10-18-00187-CR                         10/31/18

Issue:

Is a discovery request that does not designate any items sought to be produced sufficient to give the State notice of a duty to provide a 911 recording pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 39.14(a)?

Holding:

No. Before the State is required to produce discovery items under the requirements of Art. 39.14, the defendant must timely request discovery and designate which items are requested to be produced. Eleven days before the fourth jury trial in this proceeding, the State discovered a 911 recording and provided a copy to the defendant the day after the prosecutor received it. The trial court abused its discretion by excluding the recording because the discovery request (“Can I get discovery on this client? Cause #2017-241-C2.”) created no duty to produce it. Read opinion.

Commentary:

The court, consistent with an earlier decision, holds that a discovery request must specifically identify the item requested before a failure to timely produce the item may be excluded by the trial court. This result may seem harsh to outside observers, but the facts here also show that the late production of the recording was not “willful.” Rather, it appeared to be an oversight that was remedied as soon as the prosecutor discovered it. A trial court is authorized to exclude evidence only if the prosecution “willfully” fails to produce it. See Francis v. State, 428 S.W.3d 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

Announcements

NCFI Prosecutor Courses

Applications are now being accepted for the National Computer Forensics Institute prosecutor courses. All costs, including travel, are covered through the Federal government. The deadline to apply is November 26, 2018. Program dates and application information available here.

Jury selection training

Registration for Jury Selection in Impaired Driving Prosecutions is now open. This free 4-hour program will be held in three cities (Richmond, Rockwall, and San Antonio) on Friday, December 7. More information and registration links are available here.

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

State v. Waters

No. PD-0792-17                 10/31/18

Issue:

Is prosecution of an offense barred by a prior finding of “not true” as to the commission of the same offense at a probation revocation hearing?

Holding:

No. Double Jeopardy is not implicated because a person facing an allegation of a new offense at a probation revocation hearing has not been placed in jeopardy of punishment for the offense. Additionally, common law collateral estoppel does not apply because revocation hearings are highly discretionary and findings of “true” or “not true” do not compel any particular result from the proceedings. This decision overrules Ex parte Tarver, 725 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Read opinion.

Concurrence (Newell, J.):

“[The Court held in Ex parte Tarver that the State cannot prosecute a defendant for a criminal offense after a trial court rejects, at a probation revocation hearing, an allegation that the defendant committed that crime. We based that decision on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, which the United States Supreme Court held in Ashe v. Swenson is ‘embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.’ Today, we overrule Ex parte Tarver, and I join this Court’s opinion doing so. I write separately to express my reservations that the civil doctrine of collateral estoppel is truly ‘embodied within the text or history of the Fifth Amendment.’ Double jeopardy prohibits re-litigation of offenses, not issues or evidence. Cases such as Ashe are more appropriately analyzed as a due process violation rather than a double jeopardy violation.” Read opinion.

Commentary:

Good riddance. Tarver has been on life support for many years, and this decision finally puts it in its grave. Now prosecutors need not worry about coordinating motions to revoke with other counties to avoid compromising new offenses. It also removes any incentives for defendants to manipulate the revocation process to obtain a more favorable disposition of new offenses.

In re State ex rel. Mau v. Third Court of Appeals

No. WR-87,818-01                            10/31/18

Issue:

May a trial court dismiss a jury and impose deferred adjudication after a defendant pleads guilty to the jury mid-trial and the jury returns a guilty verdict?

Holding:

No. At the time that the defendant pled guilty to the jury, he did not waive his right to a jury trial nor did the State consent to a waiver. Without such a waiver, the trial court must resolve the issue of guilt by a jury trial. Furthermore, the trial court has a ministerial duty to enter judgment on a jury’s verdict once returned. Read opinion.

Concurrence (Alcala, J.):

“I do not join the Court’s analysis in section II-A because that analysis is unnecessary to the resolution of this case and, therefore, constitutes an advisory ruling that is inappropriate for an opinion granting mandamus relief. … [A] court should limit its written opinions to grants of mandamus relief that do not create new legal standards and the rationale underlying those decisions. That is precisely what this Court properly does in sections II-B and II-C [of the majority opinion]. But this Court strays from that principle in section II-A, which unnecessarily creates new law while explaining its reasons for denying mandamus relief under an alternative theory that this Court rejects, and which is entirely irrelevant to this Court’s decision to grant mandamus relief under the other sections.” Read opinion.

Concurrence (Newell, J.):

“I write separately to observe that the Court’s analysis makes clear that there is no such thing as a ‘State’s right to a jury trial.’ Instead, the Court holds that [Code of Criminal Procedure] Article 1.13(a) provides a limitation on the trial court’s authority, rather than a grant of power to the State. … Though we have posited that the State has legitimate interests in the method of trial, it is just as easy to read Article 1.13 as ensuring greater protections for a defendant’s right to a jury by limiting how and when the defendant can waive that right. Given that, it seems odd that a defendant who wants to waive a jury could nevertheless be forced to endure one. But the statute says what it says, and mandamus is not the appropriate vehicle to second-guess our Legislature.” Read opinion.

Commentary:

The lesson here is that a trial court cannot defer an adjudication of guilt after a jury finds a defendant guilty. This is not the first trial court to try to do so over the years. The Court’s refusal to grant relief on the State’s first argument highlights an issue for another day: what is the nature of a misdemeanor jury trial after a defendant changes his plea to guilty? In a felony case, the proceeding becomes a unitary one where the jury assesses punishment.

Texas Courts of Appeals

Senn v. State

No. 02-15-00201-CR                         10/25/18

Issue:

Is the State required to show that a defendant was in a bigamous relationship with a sexual assault victim as defined by Penal Code §25.01 to prosecute him under the sexual assault enhancement in Penal Code §22.011(f)?

Holding:

Yes. Under Arteaga v. State, 521 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017), the State is required to prove facts constituting a sexual assault and facts constituting one of the six bigamy prohibitions listed in §25.01. Here, the evidence was insufficient because there was no evidence that the defendant “took, attempted, or intended to take any action involving marrying or claiming to marry [the victim] or living with [the victim] under the appearance of being married.” It is insufficient to show that if the defendant were to marry or claim to marry the victim, then he would be guilty of bigamy. Read opinion.

Dissent (Gabriel, J.):

“Because I believe the court of criminal appeals has twice stated that the State need only introduce evidence showing that the defendant would have been guilty of bigamy if he were to marry or claim to marry his victim, I would initially conclude that the State met its burden of proof regarding the enhancement allegation and would request a response to the State’s motion for rehearing.” Read opinion.

Commentary:

The majority and dissent differ over an ambiguity in the Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion in Arteaga. Here, the defendant was married at the time of the offense: thus, he was prohibited from marrying the victim or living with the victim with the appearance of being married. Accordingly, he appears to fall under the plain language of §22.011(f) and §25.01 regardless of conflicting language in Arteaga. The Court of Criminal Appeals will likely have to grant review to sort this out. Perhaps, too, the Legislature should reconsider whether §22.011(f) serves a useful purpose in the fight against sexual crimes.

Cochran v. State

No. 06-18-00048-CR                         10/31/18

Issue:

Do community supervision terms allowing the search of a probationer’s residence permit a search of his motel room?

Holding:

Yes. A condition of community supervision authorizing a search does not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as it is reasonably restricted to promote the purposes of community supervision. Here, the terms of the defendant’s community supervision were limited to “searches for illegal drugs or contraband.” These terms also authorized a search of the motel room because the repeated stays (13 of the past 19 nights) at the motel support a finding that the room was the defendant’s temporary residence. Read opinion.

Commentary:

Properly structured terms of probation like these could prove an important tool for making probation more effective for rehabilitation as well as fighting crime.

Announcements

NCFI Prosecutor Courses

Applications are now being accepted for the National Computer Forensics Institute prosecutor courses. All costs, including travel, are covered through the Federal government. The deadline to apply is November 26, 2018. Program dates and application information available here.

New mandatory Brady training available online

TDCAA’s new state-mandated Brady training video is now available online through our website. As required by that statute (which went into effect on January 1, 2014), every attorney prosecuting a jailable criminal offense must complete one hour of instruction on a prosecutor’s duty to disclose such evidence and information within 180 days of assuming those duties, and Court rules require prosecutors to take a refresher course in the fourth year after completing that initial course. Our new 2018 course satisfies either requirement, and successful completion of the course will be recorded by TDCAA and shared with the Court as proof of satisfying this state mandate. Those who complete the course will also receive one hour of MCLE ethics credit from the State Bar of Texas. Visit our homepage to access and complete this course.

Jury selection training

Registration for Jury Selection in Impaired Driving Prosecutions is now open. This free 4-hour program will be held in three cities (Richmond, Rockwall, and San Antonio) on Friday, December 7. More information and registration links are available here.